
Seventeen years after the transition to democracy, the African National Congress (ANC) still claims the loyalty of over 60 percent of a South African electorate deeply divided by multiple, cross-cutting identities. The ANC has no patronage machine, and discontent with its policies and performance is widespread. What explains its sweeping electoral success? In this impressive and clearly written book, Karen Ferree draws on election, opinion, and campaign data to find that the ANC secures its dominance by painting the leading opposition parties white. Ferree argues that the ruling party uses a negative framing strategy that relies on “the control of information and reputation, the ability to frame election campaigns through a deeper campaign chest and bigger media presence, and a monopoly of African political talent” to cast opposition parties as untrustworthy (p. 3). By unpacking the ANC’s manufactured “racial census” Ferree contributes to our understanding of how racialized electoral politics are produced and argues that framing is a common tool in ruling parties’ “repertoires of dominance” (p. 222).

Ferree finds that racial loyalties, policy preferences, and performance criteria do not explain South African voter patterns. As an alternative, she introduces the concept of party labels, or branding, which provide voters with a “cognitive shortcut” (p. 17). Ferree finds a strong correlation among party labels, voter trust, and voter choice. The data also indicate that labels are particularly salient for voters’ attitudes toward opposition parties. As these parties lack access to patronage and cannot claim legislative successes, they must focus on campaign tactics and candidate selection to rebrand, develop trust, and win votes.

South African opposition parties have had limited results with these two strategies. Drawing on campaign data from 1994, 1999, and her own 2004 dataset (generated from 1,200 newspaper articles), Ferree finds that the ANC and two leading white opposition parties have consistently deployed racial arguments to negatively label their competitors. The ANC excelled at this game; it even used a racialized strategy against its African opponents, depicting them as violence-prone apartheid collaborators. Ferree also finds that the ANC benefitted from its large size and resource base. She compiles another original dataset (coding over a thousand ANC, National Party, and Democratic Party candidates by race) to confirm that small size constrains opposition recruitment of qualified elite candidates. However, the ANC can “retain its candidates, sort them, and promote the ones it deems valuable”; it also can poach quality opposition African candidates, thwarting opposition efforts to rebrand (p. 192).

Although Ferree acknowledges that competition over framing is neither free nor fair, her argument would have been even stronger if she had delved more deeply into how ruling parties acquire the capacity to label their opponents.
Ferree does not address ANC threats to media independence, its questionable access to excessively large campaign war chests, or its co-optation of civil society. These tactics cast a shadow on the future of South African party competition and suggest that more research is needed on how the negative framing that Ferree details is implicated in the erosion of democratic politics.

Ferree’s revelation of negative framing as a tool for building a racial consensus and maintaining party dominance, her use of survey data to confirm that party labels are associated with voting patterns, her theory about party size, and her new datasets make this book a must-read not only for scholars of South African politics, but for anyone interested in racial and ethnic politics, campaign strategies, candidate selection, and ruling parties.

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Russia’s Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Fall of the Wall by Jonathan Haslam. New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2011. 512 pp. $38.00.

In his latest book, Jonathan Haslam draws on decades of reflection and prodigious research to provide an invaluable analysis of the views and circumstances that created and propelled the Cold War. He examines two interrelated Cold Wars: one over the balance of power in Europe, which emerged from World War II and lasted until 1989, and the other the global challenge to liberal capitalism that began with the communist victory in Russia in 1917. His focus is not so much on the events of this long conflict, which have been adequately narrated elsewhere, but rather on how the leadership in Moscow viewed and responded to the constantly changing international situation. His account is based on remarkably comprehensive reading of the Russian documents and memoirs that have become available since 1991, as well as American, British, French, German, and Italian archives, memoirs, and oral histories, contemporary periodicals, and scholarly literature in many languages.

Extensively citing records of internal discussions within the Soviet leadership, Haslam reveals how Moscow interpreted Western intentions, fears, and aims. He is particularly strong in documenting the policy and personal disputes among Soviet leaders as they evolved over the course of the Cold War. Despite these often fierce disagreements, however, the Manichean worldview created by Marxist-Leninist ideology was broadly shared among the range of personalities in the Kremlin, in Haslam’s view. He thus takes issue with John Gaddis’s interpretation in We Now Know, which assigns the bulk of the blame for the conflict to Joseph Stalin. For Haslam, Stalin was “a necessary but not a sufficient condition” of the Cold War’s “occurrence and continuation” (p. 394).

Haslam emphasizes the improvisational nature of Soviet actions, as well as the contributions made by Western greed and confusion and Third World